Risk Reduction for Countering Violent Extremism

Explorative Review by the International Resource Center for Countering Violent Extremism

Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS)
The QIASS Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project

Management Team

- Ali Soufan – Program Executive
- Mark Fallon – Program Manager
- Daniel Freedman – Policy Advisor

Research Team

- Randy Borum – Project Research Director
- John Horgan – Project Research Director

Site Visit Team

- Michael Gelles – Team Leader, Singapore Site Visit
- Steve Kleinman – Team Leader, Indonesia Site Visit
- Susan Sim – SE Asia Area Expert
- Tom Neer – Team Leader, Great Britain Site Visit
- Stephen White – Europe Area Expert
- Barry McManus – Team Leader, France Site Visit

© 2010 Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS)

The Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS) is a professional institute serving to raise security standards, knowledge, and cooperation within the Gulf region and across the world. Clients are prepared for the complex challenges of today's world through exceptional training and innovative techniques, by facilitating excellence in education and research, and by forging lasting security partnerships across nations and cultures.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>p. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>p. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>p. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>p. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>p. 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>p. 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>p. 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>p. 47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

The QIASS Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project was a descriptive, exploratory study, not just of “deradicalization” or “terrorist rehabilitation” programs, but also of strategic counter-terrorism approaches in France, Indonesia, Northern Ireland, Singapore, and Great Britain. The diversity among the objectives and approaches in these countries was striking. Reducing the risk of engagement (and/or re-engagement) in terrorism was the key and singularly common feature across this array of programs. Accordingly, we suggest these collective efforts might be more appropriately referred to as “risk reduction” initiatives (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). None of programs we visited had systematic “outcome” data that could be used to evaluate them, but each had some useful elements.

- **Singapore** has a fully developed, multi-faceted, resource-intensive risk reduction program for militant detainees. The Government uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) primarily to neutralize terrorist plots rather than charge suspects in court. ISA detainees may be placed in physical detention or restrictive release. The program has three core components: Psychological, Social and Religious.

- **Indonesia’s Detachment 88** (Indonesia’s police counterterrorism unit) operates a highly focused intelligence source development program that matches unit members with known violent extremists to develop individual, personal relationships. A local NGO operated by a former radical uses a similar approach but only for rehabilitation, not to elicit security-related information.

- **Northern Ireland**’s CVE efforts are embedded in a multi-layered national peace process based on a philosophy of “engaged grievance management.” The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) leads an engaged, community policing initiative, which aims to challenge the ideology of violent extremists, empower individuals who are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, and enhance community resilience.

---

• **Great Britain** has an elaborate, multi-pronged national CVE effort, but one focused on persons “at-risk” rather than those who are convicted or detained. The strategic cornerstone, known as PREVENT, focuses on countering ideological support for violent extremism; disrupting those who promote the ideology; supporting persons vulnerable to recruitment; enhancing community resilience; and addressing extremist-related grievances.

• **France** believes rehabilitation or deradicalization programs for violent extremists generally have no value. They view terrorism principally as a strategic threat, and have crafted an intelligence-driven approach to prevention. They seek only to counter violence and terrorism, not the underlying ideologies. Using the leverage of their laws and justice system, they assertively collect intelligence against, and disrupt the operations of, individuals and groups engaged in violent extremist activity.

The nature of this sample and the methodology employed do not permit a distillation of “best practices” as that term is commonly used. “Best practice” definitions and criteria typically require that the approach or technique has proved its success in implementation and is transferable elsewhere. They are also typically defined by their relative, demonstrated superiority over other approaches or techniques. Those conditions do not exist here. There are, however, some practical and overarching observations to emerge from the project, including:

• In countering violent extremism, one size does not fit all (or even most). There may be no single “right” answer to understanding violent extremism, but two suggestions are clear: local knowledge is often a good place to start and people’s motivational pathways in and through terrorism are often complicated. Extremism is not always driven by the explicit ideology or the “cause.”

• Among the countries we studied, most of them have a goal in mind, but few have a clearly defined strategy for how to get there.
• Different programs have very different objectives and expectations for both community- and individual-level outcomes. It helps to be explicit and clear up front about those objectives, how they will be measured, and which ones to pursue.

• Nearly everyone thinks systematic program evaluations are important, but no one does them. This is a critical deficiency in this global effort. Knowledge of whether the program is “working” cannot be established without objective and systematic evaluation. Unknowingly sustaining and growing a program that is not working is costly, inefficient, and, at times, even counterproductive.

• Systems and interagency relationships are critical. Partnerships among agencies and systems are a centerpiece of the approaches in every country we visited where there is any degree of satisfaction or success.

• Violent extremism is not evenly distributed throughout the world, and typically not even within a given country. Countries seeking to address the problem of violent extremism at a strategic level should carefully examine “hot spot” areas and conditions that might exist locally. They should also examine how the state’s own actions, inactions, or reactions might be fueling rather than mitigating militant sentiments.
Introduction

As nations around the world continue their struggle against violent extremism, many are entering a new phase of deliberation. They have realized that ridding communities of existing terrorists may be a necessary goal, but it is not sufficient for long-term success. Prevention – in a variety of forms - is shaping up to be one of the greatest challenges (and opportunities) in the global struggle against terrorism. This study – the QIASS Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project - sought to explore how these issues have been approached in France, Indonesia, Northern Ireland, Singapore, and Great Britain.

The Spectrum of Countering Terrorism

Prevention poses a new set of questions for the counterterrorism effort, including how to prevent incarcerated terrorists who are about to be released from rejoining extremist groups, and how to prevent criminals or less committed extremists either from becoming terrorists or from increasing their commitment to violent ideologies while they are incarcerated or detained. These may be viewed as “strategic counterterrorism approaches” and it is relatively new territory. Many countries have barely begun to think about these issues, and very few have conceived comprehensive strategies that address the entire spectrum from vulnerable individuals and communities, to actions at initial capture/detention, through to release, reintegration and follow-up. A thoughtful view of that spectrum, however, is essential to sustainable success.

Often overlooked is the value of understanding the radicalization process at a local level – not just, why people become engaged in violent extremism, but also how. Numerous efforts have been made internationally to delineate discrete (and ostensibly universal) “stages” of radicalization into violent extremism, but these seem to offer little value for strategic counterterrorism efforts. There is no “gold standard” model. If we have learned anything in the past decade about the radicalization process, it is this: different people engage with violent extremist ideologies or actors in different venues, for different reasons, at different points in
time. Moreover, their pathways in and through that experience are most often neither linear nor sequential.

In our country site visits, we found – contrary to some popular beliefs – that most terrorists do not join groups for global reasons, but rather for local reasons. They may not receive a recruitment “cold call,” but instead are “spotted” by influencers who focus on their grievances or capitalize on their limited knowledge of religion and history. A better understanding of the whys and hows of terrorist engagement can facilitate more locally tailored and sophisticated counterterrorism interventions across the spectrum.

Capture and detention are just tools; they are not long-term solutions. A substantial number of persons with alleged connections to violent extremist organizations have been incarcerated over the past decade, and some are now being released back to the community. A proportion of them have more extreme views and commitments to violence than when they began their detention. In Indonesia, our project team heard directly from former terrorists about how, while in jail, they were given books on martyrdom, materials to plan future attacks, and even control of prayer groups, which presented the opportunity to influence other prisoners. In Great Britain, we heard how extremist clerics are issuing fatwas from within the prison walls, rallying followers and even successfully converting non-extremist offenders to their cause. Perhaps not surprisingly, some of those released return to their violent milieus and networks, and participate in subsequent terrorist attacks.

Although there are numerous problems inherent in the detention environment, there are also potential opportunities. For some detained terrorists, incarceration marks their first experience in being separated from the collective influence of other extremists. They have time to reflect on their beliefs, choices, and futures. Some individuals may become receptive to alternative ideas and be willing to critically examine justifications for their behavior. In a small number of cases, this had led to a recognition that they were seduced into embracing a false set of beliefs. They may change their choices about engaging in violence – maybe even some of their ideas or beliefs. Nevertheless, upon release, the now “former” terrorist can be a credible voice among active militants. From Europe to Southeast Asia, we saw numerous examples of how a reformed, but experienced voice, carries enormous power.
Whether or not a detainee changes his belief system while incarcerated, his or her release can serve as another critical “tipping point.” As one example, newly released terrorists have faced complications in establishing bank accounts due to international banking rules that have placed them on “watchlists.” Without a bank account, they will have difficulty in securing a job and reintegrating into a community increasingly linked by electronic commerce. Such administrative obstacles have the effect of creating a sense of frustration that can hinder their ability to assimilate back into society and can make a return to the company of their terrorist associates a more appealing option. Countries are trying to navigate these types of problems at a local level while advocating for broader policy change within the international community.

**A NEW GENERATION OF PROGRAMS**

A steadily increasing number of countries have adopted initiatives to prevent involvement in terrorism, disrupt the activities of terrorists, and reduce the likelihood of re-engagement. Countries concerned with the challenges of terrorism are looking beyond defending against current threats and instead are focusing on identifying and mitigating the risk posed by emerging ones. Accordingly, these efforts are less about “de-radicalization” and more about "risk reduction" (Horgan & Braddock, 2010).

**WHAT ARE THE OBJECTIVES?**

Broadly conceived, the programs we have examined use a variety of means to effect one or more of the following security-related objectives (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009):

- Reducing the number of active terrorists
- Reducing violence and victimization

---


• Re-orienting ideological views and attitudes of the participants
• Re-socializing ex-members to a lawful and productive life
• Acquiring intelligence, evidence and witnesses in court cases
• Using repentant ex-terrorists as opinion builders
• Sowing dissent within the terrorist milieu
• Providing an exit from terrorism and underground life
• Replacing repressive means with approaches that are more respectful of human rights
• Reducing the economic and social costs of keeping a large number of terrorists in prison for a long time
• Increasing the legitimacy of the government or state agency

Practically speaking, reducing the risk of engagement (and/or re-engagement) in terrorism is the key and singularly common feature across a diverse array of programs.

WHAT ARE THE METHODS?

Whether reduced risk requires only a behavioral change, or something deeper, remains a matter of debate. Empirical research (e.g. Horgan, 2009⁴) suggests that individuals may disengage from terrorism (with low risk of re-engagement) without necessarily changing their views about the legitimacy or morality of their actions. If true, then attitude change would not necessarily have to precede behavior change. De-radicalization, however, by definition, focuses on changing thoughts, beliefs and attitudes, presumably with the hope that behavior change will follow. It is much more of a traditional “rehabilitative” view.

Programs use very different concepts and language to describe their approaches. Some claim that their programs are designed to “fix minds” (Fleishmann, 2007⁵) or

---


to “deprogram terrorists” (Martin, 2007). One official claimed that through his program, terrorists can be “brought back” from their extremism (Henry, 2007) in a way that parallels “deprogramming” interventions for members of religious cults. Although the general idea of de-radicalization seems sensible, specifying what such a transformation might mean and how it might be accomplished or measured is much more complicated.

**WHAT ARE THE OUTCOMES?**

If some programs aim to change people’s views, and others attempt primarily to change behavior, do both approaches work? Does either of them work? These are both important questions to answer. From time-to-time, some program officials have made claims of startling success, but systematic evaluations of outcomes or effectiveness are virtually nonexistent. Not that assessing – or even defining – outcomes for this kind of program is easy; it clearly is not. However, there are good reasons to at least ask the question.

Recently, international headlines have focused on several disengagement or deradicalization programs. The simple fact that a program exists – or that a program has been found to have adverse outcomes – has been sufficient to generate public interest. Media coverage seems to rarely celebrate the success stories. Is this because such programs are just extreme outlier cases? Without a systematic evaluation, the answer remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that these dramatic stories can seriously complicate any meaningful assessment of program effectiveness. There is an urgent need to systematically and objectively evaluate the effectiveness of risk reduction programs, and to identify clear and explicit criteria for establishing their success.

**WHO ARE THE STAFF AND PARTICIPANTS?**

---


National governments administer most of the formal risk reduction programs, but there is often a prominent role for non-governmental organizations as well. In some of the reportedly successful cases, cross-agency collaboration between security (police and intelligence organizations) and social services (welfare agencies, educational institutions) is critical. The range of practitioners providing program services is decidedly broad, from mental health professionals and subject matter experts to reformed ex-terrorists to those who manage economic resources or facilitate interagency networking. In some cases, the family members of participants may also be involved.

Program eligibility and participation also vary. Detained or incarcerated terrorists with potential for release are ideal subjects for these initiatives. However, some programs have also reached out to the leaders of extremist groups and ideologues, to supporters and sympathizers, and to parents and family members of those who have participated in subversive and terrorist activity. An increasing number of programs are seeking to reduce the flow of new, mostly young recruits into violent extremist organizations.

**WHAT ARE PARTICIPANTS’ INCENTIVES AND RESPONSIBILITIES?**

Potentially eligible candidates are presented with a host of incentives to participate in the program:

- Full or partial amnesty for crimes committed
- Sentence reduction
- Improved prison conditions
- Serving in prison with other ex-members
- Job training, placement and education for reintegration
- Economic subsidies to participants and their families
- Assistance in forming a new family
- Developing new social networks
- Developing a new identity

---

In return, governmental agencies and program officials often have the following expectations of the participants:

- Disengagement from terrorism and related activities (direct activity)
- Disengagement from radical movements and associated politics (indirect activities)
- Accepting and serving reduced sentences for crimes committed
- Providing intelligence and/or serving as a witness in court, which may or may not result in delivering testimony that may see the subsequent imprisonment of former comrades
- Meeting victims as part of reconciliation and restorative justice initiatives
- Distancing themselves publicly from terrorism and extremist activity
- Taking part in activities aimed at reducing recruitment into extremist groups or encouraging disengagement

This global array of programs is as widely dispersed programmatically as it is geographically. There are many different methodologies, target groups, and possible points for intervention. The QIASS Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project sought to explore a diverse, global sample of these strategic counterterrorism approaches. Our project team often had unprecedented access to program officials and operations. In a number of countries, we were the first foreign entity granted permission to explore them. The unique, multi-disciplinary project team included investigators, intelligence officers, behavioral analysts, psychologists and academics, who had previously worked with agencies such as the FBI, CIA, NCIS, British police, and Singaporean Intelligence. What follows is a description of each country’s approach and observations about possible “lessons” for other countries attempting to address these challenging issues.
Singapore

The CVE Risk Reduction Project Team visited Singapore between August 23 and August 27, 2010. The site visit included semi-structured interviews as well as open discussions with representatives from the following:

- Internal Security Department (ISD) and Singapore Police
- Senior leaders from the Home Affairs Ministry, including the Deputy Prime Minister who was then concurrently serving as Home Affairs Minister
- Leaders and staff from the Singapore After Care Group (ACG); the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) and the Singapore Prison Programs.

SUMMARY OVERVIEW

The Singapore Government has operated a multi-dimensional risk reduction program for violent extremists since 2002. It is a long-term, resource-intensive program with perpetual follow-up, targeted specifically toward persons who have become involved with the militant group Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Approximately 60 persons have been enrolled since the program’s inception. The program is operated primarily by Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD), but also includes specialists in religious education, social services, and health/mental health from both the public and private sectors. Its primary objective and critical measure of success is preventing a terrorist attack in Singapore, but it does also aim to “rehabilitate” or restructure some of the underlying ideological beliefs that might catalyze violent action.
PROGRAM ORIGINS

Singapore began its risk reduction program for violent extremists in 2002. In 2001, a cadre of men affiliated with JI were engaged in a large scale plot to bomb the Singapore-based embassies of the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Israel. In December 2001, Singapore's ISD detected and interdicted the plot, making fifteen arrests within one month in connection with that planned attack. ISD arrested two-dozen more JI militants as a result of subsequent investigations over the next two years. The government detained most of these individuals under provisions of its Internal Security Act (ISA), which gives law enforcement considerable latitude to hold persons who pose a threat to the country’s security, although detention orders beyond 30 days have to be approved by the Cabinet and directed by the Singapore President. Recognizing the potential for harm posed by the detainees as well as others in Singapore who might be influenced by JI, ISD began to plan for risk reduction interventions.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

Singaporean officials were clear and unanimous in describing the program’s primary purpose and policy objective: “to keep the country safe.”

PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS

Participant Selection & Characteristics:

The Singaporean risk reduction program targets detainees held under the ISA and the government used this legal structure to neutralize terrorist plots rather than charge suspects in court. The program targets persons connected to JI who have come to the attention of the Singaporean security services, though they now include “self-radicalized” individuals who have made a commitment to radical Islam and who are moving down a path from idea to violent action. They become of interest to the government when their behavior becomes provocative, such as seeking out
training opportunities with known terrorist organizations or experimenting with bomb-making manuals downloaded from the Internet.

Potential program candidates are assessed by a multidisciplinary team, which includes an ISD case officer, psychologist and religious counselor. The assessment involves a combination of structured testing in the form of personality inventories and cognitive tests as well as a qualitative, individual case review that analyzes:

- How the detainee was recruited and radicalized, including development of capability and training;

- The detainee’s network and intentions;

- The nature and degree of risk the detainee poses for future violent extremism action; and

- The detainee’s motivation for participating in the program and amenability to change/rehabilitation/reintegration.

Some senior officials expressed deep reservations about the feasibility or advisability of relying too heavily on structured measures or “objective” metrics. They are concerned that results could easily mischaracterize the program’s effects, and fail to capture what matters most. The outgoing ISD Director observed that the field of “de-radicalization” is far too new to be able to establish meaningful standards or measurements as to what constitutes “success.” He believes setting unfounded metrics creates a risk of investing too heavily in specific elements of program development that may ultimately prove irrelevant as the field matures.

Detainees, to date, have ranged in age from 20 to 60, but the majority are in their 40s. Only male detainees have thus far been enrolled in the program, but plans are in place to accommodate females if necessary. This would include alternate facilities and the assignment of female case officers/counselors where appropriate.

*Program Orientation:*
The Singaporean risk reduction program is a security-based program, with multidisciplinary participation. Though it has certain rehabilitative objectives, it is not considered a correctional or penal program. The Home Affairs Ministry administers the program, and the ISD directly supervises and controls its operation. An ISD Case Officer is assigned to oversee each detainee’s case.

The program focuses principally on early tertiary prevention; that is, on persons who have demonstrated an ideological commitment to JI’s brand of violent extremism and who have engaged in some level of attack-related behavior.

Government officials view it both as a “de-radicalization” and as a “rehabilitation” program, designed to modify the individual’s militant JI-induced beliefs about Islam and the Qur’an.

The Singapore program is supported not only by the government, but also by the citizens in the service of protecting the community of Singapore from terrorism.

Program Structure and Operation:

The program has operated continuously since 2002, with the first detainee receiving services in 2003. To date, approximately 60 detainees have entered the program. Nearly all who enter are under provisions of the aforementioned Internal Security Act. About three-quarters of the extremists detained have since been released after participating in the rehabilitation program.

Most detainees begin in physical detention, which occurs at a single, secure facility where they are housed in individual cells and isolated from one another. They are engaged in program intervention activities between two and four hours each day. Typically, a participant will remain in physical detention for at least two years; some as long as six years. With sufficient progress, they may ultimately be granted a release under restrictive orders.

An “advisory board” composed of a High Court judge and two private citizens appointed by the President determines all status changes. ISD case officers and
community contacts continuously monitor – in perpetuity – all detainees regardless of their detention status. In that regard, there is life-long program participation. Approximately 40 detainees are currently in the community on restrictive orders. Approximately 15 others remain in physical detention.

The program essentially has no budgetary constraints, and no cost estimates have been calculated or reported. By all accounts, however, the Singaporean risk reduction program is both resource- and time-intensive. “Within general budget limits” the fiscal attitude taken by ISD and the authorities is one of “whatever it costs.” This posture is based on their belief that the cost(s), both social and financial, of not having a program or interventions – that is, an act of terrorism – would be much greater and more difficult to bear.

**Program Methodology**

Singapore’s risk reduction program has three core components: *Psychological, Social and Religious*. Program staff members assess detainees on each dimension.

**Psychological**: Psychological assessments include an evaluation of the following:

- ability to cope in a detention setting;

- nature and extent of the detainee’s beliefs about extremist violence and their justifications for it;

- psychological capacity for, and amenability to, cognitive restructuring or intervention to modify militant, extremist beliefs.

Psychological interventions aim to modify those beliefs, primarily through cognitive-behavioral intervention and the promotion of critical reflection. Counseling is generally provided twice per month in the facility and once a month after release (though there is individual variation) and only on an individual basis – never in group modalities.
Social: The social component focuses on facilitating the detainee’s re-integration into society. There are two primary facets:

- *The Social Rehabilitation Program*, which serves the detainee through specific efforts to enhance academic achievement, provide vocational training, and promote positive work habits; and

- *The After Care Group (ACG)*, which support the detainees’ families socially and financially by facilitating temporary economic relief, job training and placement assistance with the aim of helping to foster and sustain family stability during and after detention. Led by a designated “Aftercare Officer,” ACG focuses exclusively on the family and does not have direct contact with the detainees. ACG generally works from the assumption that JI’s influence has extended to the family, so their intervention aims to break those ties and replace them with prosocial community supports.

Religious: Equally important is the third component, the religious dimension. The cornerstone of the religious program component is *the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG)*, which was initially formed in 2003 and comprises 35 members and informal volunteers. RRG works actively to maintain their independence from the government, and most of its affiliates volunteer their time without compensation.

Through RRG and other partnerships with independent religious leaders in the community, detainees receive religious counseling and participate in one-on-one psychoeducational programs designed to “correct” distortions and misinterpretations of Islamic teaching that have been promoted by JI ideology. These interventions aim specifically to modify four pillars of JI influence:

- the ideology ("Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jemaah Islamiyah," generally translated to mean "General Guidelines of the Struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah");
- the pledge (Bay’ah);
- the mandate for militant (armed) jihad; and
• distorted teaching about the meaning of loyalty to Allah (al-Wala) and hatred of non-Muslims (al-Bara).

In addition to its work with the detainees, the RRG has taken on a broader role in community-based prevention of Islamic extremism in Singapore, including outreach efforts to promote religious tolerance throughout the country.

Program Outcomes

No formal program or outcome evaluation of Singapore’s risk reduction program has yet been conducted. The program officially defines “recidivism” as a return to detention within two years after restrictive release and a recidivist will be returned to detention if there is evidence he has re-engaged with a violent extremist ideology or activities. No cases of recidivism have occurred thus far.

Opinions differ among government officials about the need to pursue a more formal program evaluation. Some would like to see more objective “benchmarks” that could be used to improve the program over time. Others, such as ISD’s outgoing Director, have expressed deep concern about any effort to “objectively” measure what could be considered an inherently “subjective” and highly individualized process. They argue that there is no empirical basis for specifying a particular threshold or standard, either in Singapore or elsewhere.
Indonesia

The CVE Risk Reduction Project Team visited Indonesia between August 28 and September 1, 2010. The site visit included semi-structured interviews as well as open discussions with representatives from the following:

- Special Detachment 88, Indonesian National Police (Detachment 88 also facilitated an interview with a convicted JI combatant)
- Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai, Chief, National Counterterrorism Agency
- Noor Huda Ismail, founder of the Institute of International Peace Building
- Former members of Jemaah Islamiya, including those who have been convicted and imprisoned for terrorist offenses
- Professor Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono, University of Indonesia
- Ms. Sidney Jones, Senior Advisor to the International Crisis Group’s Asia Program

SUMMARY OVERVIEW

The Government of Indonesia does not operate a formal risk reduction program for violent extremists. The problem of militant activism for armed jihad is both serious and far-reaching throughout the country, with much of that activity linked to Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Yet, Indonesia has no nationally coordinated strategy to disrupt ongoing recruitment or to manage recidivism risk among convicted violent extremists once they are released. Within the government sector, what does exist is a relatively small and highly-focused intelligence source development program. Members of Detachment 88 (Indonesia’s police counterterrorism unit) are matched, where possible given limited personnel resources, based on social characteristics and home community, with known extremists who are believed to possess intelligence value. They develop personal,
responsible relationships, sometimes even providing financial assistance or remuneration. Beyond the government, there is a very small program operated by the Institute of International Peace Building. Founded in 2008, it is operated by Noor Huda Ismail, who also uses an approach of cultivating personal relationships augmented by elements of job training and religious education. Due to limited resources and access, he is unfortunately only able to reach about ten of the more than 600 ex-extremist combatants in Indonesia who have been convicted of terrorist offenses.

**Program Origins**

The Indonesian government began their informal relationship-based source development program after the first Bali bombings in 2002. The effort was initiated, and continues to be led, by Detachment 88, the Indonesian National Police force’s counterterrorism branch. Special Detachment 88 was, itself, created around this time when its leaders identified the need to obtain deep, accurate and actionable information about the activities and networks of terrorist groups operating in Indonesia.

They set out to create an “informal de-radicalization” initiative where members of Detachment 88 would develop positive relationships with known militants who were mostly from JI. Though framed as a de-radicalization outreach effort, its primary objective was to cultivate cooperation in providing intelligence, to include identifying other terror suspects and networks, and revealing details about intra-group dynamics, avenues of logistical support, and plans for future violent acts.

The rationale emerged from the Indonesian National Police’s prior experiences with JI militants, many of whom had become more defiant and active when the police treated them (or their families) harshly, but became more cooperative when approached with respect, support and occasional kindness in a manner conforming to Islamic traditions.

As a number of high value militants were incarcerated, the prisons became the program’s primary venue. This effort also involved the use of former JI militants, such as Malaysian Nasir Abbas, to talk to detained terror suspects and convicts. After their release from prison, former terror suspects received a small degree of economic assistance to start a business.
Beyond the government sector, there is another small, informal “deradicalization” program that operates through the aforementioned Institute of International Peace Building, a non-governmental organization (NGO) founded in 2008 by journalist/author Noor Huda Ismail (referred to as “Huda”).

During his youth, Huda joined Darul Islam (DI), a revolutionary movement in Indonesia established in the late 1940s with a vision for creating an Islamic state. DI leaders had selected him for training in Afghanistan; however, several events unfolded in his personal life that ultimately led him to follow a different path. Since founding the Institute, Huda has devoted himself to fighting terrorism by developing personal relationships and influence with ex-combatants. The strength of his approach is that he works outside police channels with the sole objective of rehabilitating former terrorists.

**PROGRAM OBJECTIVES**

The primary objective of Detachment 88’s initiative is to develop accurate, actionable intelligence against terrorist networks operating in Indonesia.

In contrast, objectives for the Institute of International Peace Building program are to:

1. change the problematic or risky behaviors previously exhibited by the participants and
2. reduce participants’ risk for continuing or escalating their involvement in terrorism and violent extremist activity.

**PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS**

*Participant Selection & Characteristics:*
Because the government program is not aimed principally at rehabilitation, participants are selected based almost exclusively on their assessed intelligence value. None are excluded based on considerations of risk or amenability to change.

The Institute's NGO-based program has no explicit inclusion or exclusion criteria, operating instead almost exclusively through Ismail’s direct effort. Its scale is quite modest, currently involving only ten ex-combatants (of the more than 600 ex-prisoners who had served time for terrorism-related acts) spread across Jakarta, Surakarta, Semarang and Surabaya. Participants range in age from late-twenties to late fifties and come from the lower socio-economic strata. Many participants knew Huda from the earlier schools days at the Ngruki Islamic Boarding School in Central Java or were interviewed by him, in his role as a journalist, while they were in prison.

Program Orientation:

The program in Indonesia is more of an intelligence source development program than a rehabilitation or risk reduction program. Detachment 88 operates the program with very little involvement from any other government agencies. Even when participants are incarcerated, correctional staff is not involved in the program’s operation. The correctional system is intentionally excluded because it is viewed by the security services as being corrupt and its officers as untrustworthy or ineffective. The program deliberately avoids any deep religious focus.

The NGO program run by the Institute of International Peace Building operates more as a social service and religious outreach initiative targeting extremist militants in Indonesia. It receives no funds from the Indonesian government, is not driven by intelligence needs, and does not provide participant-generated intelligence to the national security service.

Program Methodology

Once a high-value detainee is identified, Detachment 88 assigns a unit member with personal knowledge of the religious, cultural and communal environments and the context from which the terrorist was recruited to engage him in discussions about his ideology and
personal life. In doing so, the police hope that bonds of kinship, mutual trust and respect might be developed as a means of leveraging cooperation.

The Institute of International Peace Building program, which is mainly limited to Huda’s direct contacts, uses a personal outreach approach with elements of job assistance and occasional financial support to the families of terrorists. He aims to help participants to disengage from militant extremist activity by modifying their behavior, their attitudes and beliefs about violence as a legitimate means for achieving desired outcomes, and their peer associations.

Huda believes that many militants have been conditioned to suspend critical thinking about the JI’s ideology and religious doctrine, and that this capacity must be re-engaged as part of the “rehabilitation” or change process.

He receives no government funding, instead financing the Institute through book sales and private sector (NGO) sources.

**Program Outcomes**

Detachment 88 has not conducted any formal outcome evaluation of its program, but they do point to many examples where reliable intelligence sources have been successfully recruited. The Indonesian National Police generally recognize they lack in-depth information regarding the radicalization process in Indonesia, though they realize its value, particularly in support of any efforts to develop comprehensive rehabilitation or de-radicalization programs.

In 2009, the Directorate of Research and Public Service at the University of Indonesia – without government involvement – studied the “de-radicalization” process among 52 former terrorists (mostly from JI) who were incarcerated at two Indonesian correctional facilities. The study, which involved discussions between militants and trained Muslim religious scholars from the Islamic State University of Jakarta, generated a number of significant findings:
• The prisons in Indonesia have served as very fertile grounds for terrorist recruitment;

• Most terrorists had very simple cognitive structures, which made it easier to indoctrinate them with violent, extremist ideology;

• Motivations to join JI and other extremist groups in Indonesia varied considerably among individuals. Those reasons include:

  1. Normative deprivation and insecurity that comes with living in a conflict-laden region;

  2. Confusing extremist indoctrination (particularly by JI) with “education” about religious and political realities;

  3. Conventional criminal motivations (e.g., poverty, lack of economic opportunities, associations with criminals, etc.); and

  4. Motivations of a personal nature (e.g., social isolation, disengagement, desire for affinity/membership, etc.)

• More research on radicalization is needed, particularly as it pertains to Indonesian high school and college students who are seen as being at greatest risk for extremist recruitment.

The Institute’s NGO program has not conducted a formal program evaluation and has no mechanism for assessing its effectiveness. The effort is not without anecdotal success stories, however. Through the auspices of the Institute of International Peace Building, Huda has helped participants establish a chocolate factory and has found other, low-level vocational jobs that have helped facilitate a

---

9 For example, three of the Bali bombers, Amrozi, Imam Saudra and Muklas, were detained in Kerobokan Prison until after the second Bali bombing (in 2005). Thereafter, in October 2005, they were transferred to Nusakambangan Prison (a sprawling complex that contains several smaller prisons) where they helped recruit new members into the JI terrorist network. See Sidney Jones, “Deradicalization in Indonesian Prisons,” Crisis Group Asia Report No. 142, p. 8, 19 November 2007.
return to a more “normal” life. His institute has also carried out intervention programs in eight prisons.
Northern Ireland

The CVE Risk Reduction Project Team visited Northern Ireland between July 1 and July 3, 2010. The site visit included an interview with Northern Ireland’s First Minister, as well as formal briefings, semi-structured interviews, and open discussions with the following:

- Senior officials from the Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI), including the Chief and Assistant Chief Constables in Belfast
- Members of the Policing Board
- Members of the PSNI’s Community Engagement Unit
- The PSNI’s Legal Advisor on Human Rights
- Members of the Community Foundation of NI
- Former republican and loyalist prisoners/combatants
- Members of the Independent Monitoring Commission
- A leading academic criminologist with expertise on extremist ideology and violence in Northern Ireland

Summary Overview

There is no single program in Northern Ireland that can be characterized exclusively as involving a “de-radicalization” or “rehabilitation” initiative for violent extremist detainees. Instead, the region has experienced a multi-layered peace process that began with a series of cease-fires in 1994, and culminated in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement). The overarching philosophy might be described as one of “engaged grievance management,” which also aims to counter radicalization of a potential “new” generation of extremists and the possible re-engagement of “old” disengaged combatants. This process has spawned dozens of public and privately sponsored programs designed to maintain peace, ensure security, address grievances and perceived inequalities, promote healing, and build trust between the police and the community. Some of these initiatives cater to
specific groups such as victims, ex-prisoners, youth and women. In Northern Ireland, a strategy of engaged, community-policing aims to challenge the ideology of violent extremists and empower individuals who are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. The plan includes interventions to enhance community resilience by mitigating social exclusion and reducing unemployment. Within the government sector, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) primarily leads these efforts. It is a broadband peace-maintenance effort meant to address underlying grievances, build trust and reconciliation, and discourage violent activism, rather than a narrow effort to mitigate recidivism risk among known violent extremists. Despite a recent upsurge in violence by republican dissidents, these efforts appear to have been remarkably successful in helping to end violence and maintain peace.

**Program Origins**

Northern Ireland comprises six of the 32 counties (Derry, Antrim, Down, Armagh, Fermanagh and Tyrone) on the island of Ireland and has a population divided by religion, politics and territory. There are two broadly identifiable communities: Nationalist and Unionist.

- **Nationalists** (predominantly Catholic, and representing just under 50% of the population) support the re-unification of the six Counties of Northern Ireland with the remaining 26 Counties of the Irish Republic to re-establish a 32-county Ireland.

- **Unionists** (predominantly Protestant, and just over 50% of the population) seek to retain the union between Northern Ireland and Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales).

Many Nationalists seek re-unification of the island by peaceful means, but others support what is locally referred to as “armed struggle,” or violent means – these Nationalists can be distinguished by the term “Republicans.” The most active Republican group throughout the Troubles was the Provisional IRA (PIRA), a movement that has in recent years been succeeded by a series of splinter groups, including the Real IRA, Continuity IRA, Oglaigh na h’Eiran (ONH), and several other offshoots.
The Police Service of Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom (UK) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). Because of the country’s history, culture and geographical divide, the police have had to adapt their strategies to fit the environment. They have developed robust community partnerships that include shared perspectives and power arrangements. They do not, however, have risk reduction or programs targeted specifically at detained persons, as those in custody are the responsibility of the Prison Service or Justice Department of Northern Ireland.

**Program Objectives**

At this juncture, Northern Ireland’s principal objective with this array of programs is to maintain the peace. Though most armed sectarian conflict ended by the late 1990s, both government and non-government bodies recognize the potential for resurgence. By monitoring and managing social and political grievances, legitimizing and empowering non-violent activism, and sharing governance and accountability, they seek to keep ex-prisoners and militants engaged in non-violent activity and prevent conditions from developing that would incubate a new generation of violent extremists.

**Program Orientation & Methodology**

Comprehensive policing reform was a major element of the Northern Ireland peace process. These reforms aimed to make the police more representative, accountable and effective. A proactive community policing strategy was the platform for this reform. It has parallels with UK’s overall counterterrorism strategy known as PREVENT\(^\text{10}\) (PSNI uses the term “ENGAGE”), which involves the community in addressing social exclusion and unemployment, challenging violent ideologies, empowering individuals who are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, and increasing community resilience to terrorism.

Northern Ireland’s overarching philosophy for post-conflict peace might be considered as one of “engaged grievance management.” Their emphasis on community engagement and addressing grievances is borne of decades of experience with armed struggle during which they learned that real and perceived

---

\(^\text{10}\) See page 34 for a detailed description of the UK PREVENT program.
grievances, including human rights abuses by the state and its institutions, fuel conflict. The police and the local government acknowledged the need to confront, and admit to, their own past abuses. Several former combatants interviewed for this project emphasized the importance of airing grievances and the critical role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this process. This kind of acknowledgement and exchange was a social predicate for moving forward toward peace.

The following are several of the key features – philosophically and practically – of Northern Ireland’s peace maintenance effort:

- Militants on both sides of the conflict (loyalist and republican) were encouraged to announce ceasefires, decommission weapons and step away from violence without giving up on political ambitions, a process commonly referred to as Disarming, Demobilizing and Reintegrating.
  
  o Reintegration, which they believe is perhaps the most critical ingredient for long-term success, involves redirecting and assimilating former militants into non-violent political/social activism.

- Former armed militants, many of whom were ex-prisoners, developed grass-roots initiatives to dissuade others from violence. These efforts sought to educate others about how they came to be involved in armed struggle, how the experience of incarceration affected them, their families and communities, and to acquaint them with opportunities to become involved in post-conflict work on conflict transformation and community development.¹¹

- Creating legitimate roles for activism helped to lessen the polarized dynamic where Nationalism was equated with terrorism and the struggle was equated with war against the State. The focus shifted away from divisive struggles about the “cause” to the tactics of activism. The government did not seek to “rehabilitate” the militants’ political ideas, but to engage them cooperatively to address problems related to violence. Extreme – even radical – ideas were acceptable; violence, however, was not.

¹¹ From Prison to Peace; Learning from the Experiences of Political Ex-prisoners. A Resource for Local and Global Citizenship at Key Stage Four, published by the Community Foundation of Northern Ireland, Belfast.
• Use of neutral language regarding the conflict and its participants has been another important component of the Northern Ireland peace process. Individuals previously described by the police in the 1970s-80s as “terrorists” are now formally referred to as former combatants and ex-political prisoners. The police rarely use the term “terrorism” when discussing sectarian violence. Instead, they refer to “violent extremist” activity.

This philosophical shift has also helped to shape PSNI’s thinking about terrorist recruitment. Realizing that persons who engage in violent extremism do so for a range of reasons, the police began to see that the recruitment problem was not so much driven by “radicalizers” as by “violence entrepreneurs.” Professor Kieran McEvoy of Queen’s University, Belfast coined this term to describe those who seek to gain—economically, politically and even personally—from acts of violence carried out by others. Violence entrepreneurs are essentially “salesmen” who seek to persuade others to engage in violent extremism.

Sharing power in the political realm and in police reforms – though not without its challenges - has also boosted the legitimacy of non-violent activism. The Northern Ireland Policing Board (NIPB) aims to make the police more accountable, open, and transparent through greater community oversight. Consequently, political parties such as Sinn Fein (the political wing of the IRA) now engage in policing in a very public way, a sign of progress and political development, community engagement and normalization. Making the police more acceptable, representative and accountable to all sections of the community helps to address old perceptions, stereotypes and grievances. Nevertheless, although British soldiers are no longer deployed there for civil order and the police have expressly denounced and forbidden past practices of harassment, the narrative of state abuses remain prominent in the minds and attitudes of some of those affected and their families. These may require another generation to transcend.

The peace in Northern Ireland is a broadband change process and it is important to understand that, in itself, it is an attempt to prevent further terrorism by addressing grievances, building trust and thereby countering radicalization. It includes many of the recommended key elements of any community change:
• **Shared vision of success** – a regional, representative, power-sharing local government; an end to conflict, an agreement that there would be no united Ireland until the majority of Northern Ireland’s citizens voted for it; and old grievances and real (and perceived) inequalities addressed.

• **Strategic plan** – this is contained in the 1998 Belfast Agreement (or ‘Good Friday Agreement’ - GFA), which among other things, promised changes to legislation, to policing, release of prisoners, ceasefires and decommissioning of illegal weapons.

• **Political will** – all the political parties agreed to it, including those representing the militant armed factions.

• **Legislation** – new laws were passed dealing with equality, political reform, and police reform.

• **Community engagement**, providing opportunities for involvement and support for change(s), including roles for former prisoners.

• **Security** – improved security permitted other useful changes such as withdrawal of British army and its infrastructure, especially watchtowers and barracks; MI5 to take over national security role from police; the previous police organization known from 1922 – 2001 as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) became the more representative and carefully overseen PSNI; and an Independent Monitoring Commission established to report on levels of violence and adherence to agreements by major paramilitary/terrorist groups.

• **Resources** – major investment and funding made available to the province to fund police reform, to support prisoner rehabilitation/reintegration.
As a result any ACPO PREVENT strategy or scheme implemented in Northern Ireland had to take a sensitive account of all these matters and even terminology had to be specifically tailored to the area and its needs.

While the peace process has brought an end to most of the violence, in recent years there has been a resurgence of deadly bombings and shootings of police and civilian targets by so-called republican dissidents. The latter are comprised of new recruits and a critical mass of former PIRA members who have reneged on the ceasefire and decommissioning of arms, viewing the PIRA leadership as traitors who have sold out to a peace process, which in their eyes, has not successfully reunified Ireland.

The PSNI continues to be concerned that some young people remain attracted to Irish Republican groups, that the dissident role still carries some status in certain communities, and that the Republican leadership’s charisma still gives it some broader appeal.

**Program Outcomes**

There has been no formal outcome evaluation of the Northern Ireland peace process or its efforts to deter future militants. Members of the Independent Monitoring Commission recognize the need for objective and meaningful ways to measure the effectiveness of any given preventive or intervention effort, and the need to better understand the environment from which a new wave of radicalism might emerge.

Along with other tools such as strategic planning formats and human rights assessments, the PSNI use the Community Impact Assessment (CIA) to ensure police commanders consider, assess, and record their community engagement and outreach efforts and understand the local effects of police actions before and after significant operations. This practice draws upon an observation set forth by the Belfast-based Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) in a report entitled, *War on Terror: Lessons from Northern Ireland*. In this report, the authors note that “the level of control imposed by the law should always be proportionate to the level of risk, yet only the government, through their intelligence, can know what the level of risk is and this leaves a difficult situation.”

---

12 Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), *War on Terror: Lessons from Northern Ireland* (Belfast, UK: CAJ, 2008), 93; URL:
Great Britain

The CVE Risk Reduction Project Team visited England/Great Britain between June 21 and June 30, 2010. The site visit included formal briefings, as well as semi-structured interviews and open discussions with representatives from the following:

- UK Home Office
- Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)
- Senior officials from the British Police Service, including members of the Association of Chief Constables (ACPO)
- ACPO Force PREVENT Coordinators
- Regional PREVENT and CHANNEL Coordinators
- UK Home Office Community Engagement representatives
- Muslim elders at a local mosque
- Project directors operating diversion programs for at-risk youth
- Senior government analysts specializing in radicalization and disengagement within Great Britain.

SUMMARY OVERVIEW

The UK does not have a formal rehabilitation program designed specifically for violent extremist detainees. Their risk reduction focus is mainly on primary and secondary prevention efforts, with much less investment in “rehabilitating” persons who are already committed to, and acting upon, a violent extremist ideology. Former prisoners, now disengaged, however, are increasingly used as a resource. The UK Home Office has developed a comprehensive and wide-ranging counter-terrorism strategy known as CONTEST.

CONTEST is organized around four work streams: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare (also known as the 4 Ps).

The PREVENT stream is the one most closely aligned with risk reduction effort for countering violent extremism. It focuses on countering ideological support for violent extremism; disrupting those who promote the ideology; supporting persons vulnerable to recruitment; enhancing community resilience; and addressing extremist-related grievances. PREVENT interventions are delivered through a mechanism called CHANNEL. The interventions are – to the extent possible – individually tailored and are administered through a myriad of NGOs and community-based organizations. These programs generally aim to educate persons at risk for recruitment about the fallacies preached by violent extremists; empower them to make positive and prosocial choices about their future; and communicate core values of British citizenship pertaining to respect, rights and responsibilities. Community-level engagement and trust building based on “mutual interest” are also broader themes. These initiatives aim to address underlying conditions and grievances.

PROGRAM ORIGINS

The UK’s PREVENT strategy initially emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the government came to appreciate the nature and extent of violent extremism within its own borders. They recognized the profound threat this posed to the UK’s national security, and that it was not a problem that could be easily addressed using traditional military and law enforcement responses. Although PREVENT was first established in 2003, the program remained in a nascent stage until after the London bombings in 2005 when it began to develop more fully.

Drawing, in part, on recent experiences in Northern Ireland, the UK Home Office knew that any degree of success would require that they understand the prevailing social and political grievances and build greater credibility, trust, and a sense of shared responsibility within British Muslim communities. Many British Muslim leaders had complained for years about being stereotyped, socioeconomically marginalized, misunderstood and unfairly stigmatized as a result of the actions of a small number of violent extremists. These issues have been addressed as a part of current planning and discussions.
The London bombings of 7 July 2005, brought sharply into focus for British Security Services the reality and hazard of British communities as safe havens for existing and potential homegrown terrorists. Police began a vigorous program of outreach to stakeholders and leaders in Muslim communities, working actively in the tradition of community policing to increase the flow of information both within the security apparatus itself (specialized terrorism units, local commanders, neighborhood officers) and between the communities and the police. This required new partnerships with academics, local authorities, religious leaders and former militants and prisoners. These partnerships ultimately would become the foundation for PREVENT’s operation.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

PREVENT’s primary program objectives are as follows:

- Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism, and support mainstream voices
- Disrupt those who promote violent extremism (the police have attempted to accomplish this by developing an understanding of the radicalization process and its conditions and catalysts, educating the community about these facets, and “countering the terrorist narrative”).
- Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or have already been recruited by violent extremists
- Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism
- Address the grievances that ideologues are exploiting

PROGRAM ORIENTATION & METHODOLOGY

PREVENT is a multi-faceted, prevention-oriented, long-term risk-reduction initiative, designed to identify and divert people at risk for engaging with violent extremism. It is focused mainly on primary and secondary prevention efforts, with much less investment in “rehabilitating” persons who are already committed to, and acting upon, a violent extremist ideology.\(^\text{13}\) It seeks to engage with communities (particularly Muslim

\(^\text{13}\) Considering that the UK has designated a single prison facility to house all convicted terrorists, it seems surprising that the PREVENT strategy does not include a de-radicalization and/or rehabilitation program tailored exclusively for this population.
communities) to share information, build trust, and to encourage a safe and healthy environment.

PREVENT is nationally administered, but locally implemented. Each police constabulary (of which there are 43 in England and Wales and another in Northern Ireland) is given the flexibility to tailor PREVENT to fit the unique problems, needs and resources of its respective community. Each constabulary commander is responsible for assessing local impact factors regarding: (a) citizens’ vulnerability to extremism, (b) community resilience/receptivity to extremism, and (c) the presence of influential persons or forces promulgating violent extremism. This assessment should guide the local PREVENT implementation plan.

That plan should provide a strategy for how PREVENT’s five core objectives will be accomplished:

- “Challenging the ideology” might involve collaboration or partnership with “credible and influential voices” such as Muslim scholars, and respected public personalities to challenge the call to violence and provide a more constructive message.

- “Disrupting people and places that promote violent extremism” might involve collaborations with mosques, Islamic educational entities, and prisons, prosecuting violent extremists, or enhancing the intelligence network.

- “Supporting individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment” might take account of the roles of peer pressure, the role of the family, mentorship (or the lack thereof), and such life-changing events as trauma and immigration, and rely on interventions at an individual or community-level.

- “Increasing community resilience” might involve supporting individuals and organizations, to include community, faith-based, and private sector entities that present prosocial alternatives to “radicalizing” campaigns.
• “Addressing grievances” might include partnering with local Muslim leaders in policing or criminal justice planning, or perhaps supporting mechanisms to investigate claims of discrimination.

PREVENT is the national strategy for countering radicalization, and CHANNEL is one of its main mechanisms for implementation. CHANNEL began as the “Muslim Community Contact” program, a police-based outreach initiative extended to Islamic communities. In its current form, it operates as a pre-radicalization diversion program. Philosophically, it is a primary-secondary preventive intervention, individually tailored to a participant’s criminogenic risk.

Any individual deemed to be at risk of offending can be referred to CHANNEL for assessment and intervention. That person is first screened to determine their need/vulnerability and amenability to intervention, and to screen out persons who might undermine the safety and quality of the program. Appropriate candidates are referred to the CHANNEL coordinator, who conducts a more detailed “Preliminary Assessment” of the individual’s criminogenic/radicalization vulnerability based on:

• exposure to extremist materials

• specific social behaviors,

• history of extremist engagement,

• risk for harm, and

• suitability for CHANNEL intervention.

Appropriate candidates are then reviewed by a Multi-Agency Panel who develops an action plan and coordinates with the CHANNEL provider to monitor the individual’s progress.
This process is depicted in the following graphic:

Different CHANNEL programs have different approaches and foci, but each of them aims to identify and support persons deemed vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists. Some emphasize critical thinking and social responsibility. Others focus more on individual counseling, mentoring and other psychological interventions. Typically, these programs aim to educate persons at risk for recruitment about the fallacies preached by violent extremists; empower them to make positive and prosocial choices about their future; and communicate core values of British citizenship pertaining to respect, rights and responsibilities.

CHANNEL interventions generally include one or more of the following services:

- *Counseling* – with a focus on providing support to the individual in coping with an array of personal issues that could – individually or in combination – create vulnerabilities to extremist activities.
• *Faith Guidance* - Rather than avoid the potentially sensitive topic of religious beliefs, CHANNEL takes the rather bold step of working with an individual’s religious education with an aim toward empowering that individual with a more comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the religious doctrine that may be manipulated in messages that encourage violent extremism. The objective is to equip the individual to challenge such messages rather than be vulnerable to them.

• *Civic Engagement* - Assistance is provided to enable the individual to more effectively understand and work within the political system, from seeking citizenship to becoming engaged in the political process to the preservation of human rights.

• *Working with Support Networks* - CHANNEL recognizes – and encourages – the vital role family and social networks can play in supporting and guiding the individual.

• *Mainstream Services* - Finally, CHANNEL will, where appropriate, assist the individual in dealing with challenges relating to housing, education, medical care, and employment.

More than 20 different CHANNEL initiatives currently exist, administered through a myriad of NGOs and community-based organizations, to include the education sector, social services, children’s and youth services and offender management services. The following provides three prominent and diverse examples:

**STREET**: The London-based CHANNEL program called “STREET” (and acronym that stands for Strategies to Reach, Empower and Educate Teenagers) is run by former extremists. They report having approximately 130 cases per year, 35 of whom they consider “hard-core.” Those referred are typically between 11-19 years old, mostly males, but some females are accepted. The second largest group consists of males between the ages of 20 and 30. The youngest male referral was 9 years old.
Their principal objective is to “normalize” individuals and integrate them back into the community. They aim to encourage a more tolerant and less polarized “us vs. them” view of society. STREET’s voluntary program emphasizes practical life-choice decision-making skills, using elements of social training, psychology, theological resilience and counseling. It directly addresses the challenges of Internet influence and structures programming around five core “influencer” factors:

- Emotional well-being
- Social Exclusion and estrangement
- Perceived injustice
- Foreign policy
- Extremist ideology

**HIMMAT**: HIMMAT is an Urdu word which means courage or “one’s best effort” and the scheme is an example of one of the CHANNEL interventions in the area. It was founded in 1991 to modify deviant behavior and prevent persistent offenders from returning to crime. Their motto is “Immunization not Demonization.” HIMMAT has 85 employees and operates on an annual budget of £1.5m. It also has a branch in Bradford, England called UMMID (UMMID is also an Urdu word and means hope).

HIMMAT's mission is to help young people develop knowledge, skills, attitudes and confidence that will empower them to make positive life choices. They run various projects and have service level agreements with many other agencies, including police, probation, education and welfare services. They focus particularly on young, disaffected Asian youths who are often targets of radicalization especially in prisons.

UMMID uses the “3 x R” program – Respect, Rights, Responsibility – to promote positive citizenship. The program provides supportive interventions to the vulnerable participants and their families, and reflective accountability for their behavior. They also offer education and training services to facilitate offenders’ reintegration back into their home communities.
**VIA MEDIA:** VIA MEDIA is a human rights and social justice program for university students identified as “future leaders.” Part of the program’s appeal is that it is staffed by recent college graduates whose academic backgrounds include studies in history, civil rights and social justice. The project’s fundamental objective is “to challenge all forms of political, religious, and social repressions and to uphold and protect democracy.” In its secular, 12-week, group-based program, VIA MEDIA seeks to encourage critical thinking and social responsibility among future leaders, while providing a meaningful and effective alternative to violent extremism by:

- leveraging elements of the democratic process to effect positive change, including public campaigning and political lobbying
- promoting the values of human dignity, equality, and fairness as essentials building blocks of a democratic society and supporting young people who are subjected to discrimination and denied access to political and social services
- challenging both anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic rhetoric and policies
- encouraging young people to carefully examine the full range of their responsibilities to the nations and communities in which they live
- teaching young people how to explore history through the eyes of the oppressed regardless of race, religion, or political affiliation, and to apply the lessons of history to current struggles/problems.

While some intervention programs and initiatives have specific criteria for completion, others do not. Those who participate in PREVENT programs do so voluntarily, and since these programs do not involve detained persons, “release” is not an appropriate term. Nor is the term “reintegration” used. Instead, the focus is on “empowering” vulnerable individuals by building their awareness, giving them tools to resist the terrorist narrative, and providing them with alternatives to terrorism. Although some intervention programs make a concerted effort to include a participant’s family, the review team was unable to identify any program that involved “systematic” aftercare planning for either individuals or family members. Again, this may be due to the fact that referrals are not detainees in the process of being released.

**PROGRAM OUTCOMES**
No systematic outcome evaluation has been conducted on PREVENT or CHANNEL programs – at least not collectively. In many cases, police performance measures are tied directly to successful implementation of PREVENT, although it remains an open question as to how exactly success is measured.

Anecdotally, police in many places within Great Britain still seem to struggle to build trust and engage with Muslim communities. Some members of the community still harbor a belief that the entire PREVENT enterprise is merely subterfuge for a massive police intelligence gathering initiative. Others believe it to be more of a counter-subversion than a counterterrorism initiative, which is non-transparently aimed at changing the core beliefs – not just behavior – of less moderate Muslims.
France

The CVE Risk Reduction Project Team visited France between July 5 and July 9, 2010. The site visit included semi-structured interviews as well as open discussions with representatives from the Ministere de la Justice.

**SUMMARY OVERVIEW**

France has no direct program that manages and intervenes with persons who have been detained for involvement in terrorist or violent extremist activity. In fact, the French government explicitly dismisses the potential value of such programs as being unworthy of the time or resources required to develop and operate them. Instead, France has opted for an intelligence-driven approach rather than one involving risk-reduction. France uses the leverage of its laws and justice system to collect intelligence against, and disrupt the operations of, individuals and groups engaged in violent extremist activity. Criminal investigations in France are conducted by judges who have sweeping judicial authorities, such as issuing their own search warrants, seizures of evidence, intrusive measures including wiretapping, and cooperating with other countries in the fight against terrorism. They view terrorism principally as a strategic threat, not as a political or social deviation. Their approach is highly focused, seeking only to counter violence and terrorism, not the underlying ideologies.

**PROGRAM ORIGINS**

France’s intelligence-based system of countering terrorism began in the 1990s. Though France hosts Europe’s largest Muslim constituency – comprising 7-10% of its population – the Muslim communities, particularly in Paris, tend to be segregated, socially marginalized and highly insular. Foreigners and immigrants tend not to be well integrated into
French society, culture or politics, nor has France seemed terribly invested in their assimilation. Many French immigrants have for years complained that they face discrimination – not just socially – but in finding employment, securing and maintaining a place to live, and educating their children.

In most areas of France, immigrants have tended to congregate in a single geographic area that has evolved into a colony of sorts where the culture and customs of the old country dominate the landscape. As a result, there is very little demand – or reward – for integrating into the culture or customs of the new country. Many immigrants remain more closely aligned with their country of origin than with their adopted country. The combined effects of social alienation and discrimination, not to mention lingering emotional residue from The Algerian War, often breed anti-state sentiments and sometimes lead to violent extremism.

Though most Muslims in France, as is true elsewhere in Europe, are not violent extremists, the large number of Muslim residents and the highly strained social context made it clear to French officials that the potential threat to its internal security was both present and real. To ensure it own safety, the French Parliament enacted a series of laws to disrupt terrorist activity and facilitate aggressive intelligence gathering against potential violent extremists.

**PROGRAM OBJECTIVES**

France uses the leverage of its laws and justice system to collect intelligence against, and disrupt the operations of, individuals and groups engaged in violent extremist activity. The ultimate objective is preventing terrorist attacks within the country.

The primary objective of its intelligence effort is to develop what strategist Sun Tzu referred to as *foreknowledge*. In the French context, this equates to operationalized intelligence that seeks to “know in advance what others intend to do” based on “firsthand, immediate, concrete, and detailed” knowledge (as opposed to simply information).

---

PROGRAM OPERATION & METHODOLOGY

Based on interviews with Magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere at the French Ministry of Justice, there is no specific or formal “risk reduction program” or what some would call a “de-radicalization” or “rehabilitation” program for terrorists or violent extremists. Indeed, the French government explicitly dismisses the potential value of such programs as being unworthy of the time or resources required to develop and operate them. France, according to Judge Bruguiere, has opted for an intelligence-driven approach rather than one involving risk-reduction.

France’s approach is highly focused. It does not seek to counter extremist ideologies, only violence and terrorism. The nation’s counter-terrorism approach is relatively unconcerned with underlying grievances, community engagement or resilience, or modifying radical beliefs. They are not interested in Islamic doctrine or theology – or the debates between moderates and extremists. They see no need to invest in deterring the “next generation” of violent extremists.

Philosophically, they view terrorism not as a political or social deviation, but as a strategic threat; a global menace of a new, atypical and asymmetrical genre that demands recourse of all the state’s means, including military when necessary. The tools, however, must be sufficiently flexible that they can adapt to the needs of an evolving threat. They have chosen to emphasize two categories of these tools: laws and intelligence.

The cornerstone of France’s system of criminal procedure is the centralization of its prosecution, investigation and trials in Paris. According to the Magistrate, this allows a better understanding of a terrorist phenomenon that is ever changing.

Criminal investigations in France are conducted by judges who have sweeping judicial capabilities, such as issuing their own search warrants, seizures of evidence, intrusive measures – to include wiretapping – and cooperating with other countries in the fight against terrorism.
The French Parliament crafted and passed an aggressive set of laws that the government could use as tools to counter violent extremism. Conspiracy laws, for example, can be useful weapons against terrorist networks because they disrupt logistical and financial support, but in many democracies, they are notoriously difficult cases to prosecute and prove. France’s terrorist conspiracy law does not require proof that a collective of individuals is linked to an organization or even to a specific plan. It is sufficient to show that the collective/network was likely to give any assistance in a terrorist context to activists, even when the activists are unidentified.

The French government also established a robust intelligence capability and collaborative culture – including information sharing – among its intelligence agencies, law enforcement authorities, and the Judiciary. In countering terrorism, they emphasize, intelligence refers not only to gathering information on possible future attacks, but also gaining detailed knowledge about the individuals involved. This requires an acute awareness of – and sensitivity to – nuanced cultural and contextual factors. Officials were not particularly forthcoming with specifics regarding how they use intelligence to drive law enforcement/internal security operations to interdict violent extremism. It is clear, however, that the segregation of the Islamic community within Paris appears to be problematic. The insular nature of that community presents formidable challenges to the internal security intelligence collection effort.

As is the case in other Western countries, countering terrorism is a shared responsibility among several intelligence, internal security, and law enforcement agencies. These include the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (General Directorate of External Security, DGSE) which serves as the agency for foreign intelligence; the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence, DCRI), with a charter that includes counterterrorism and fighting violent subversion; the Direction du Renseignement Militaire (Directorate of Military Intelligence, DRM), the French military intelligence agency (roughly equivalent to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency); and the Direction de la Protection de la Sécurité et de la Défense (Directorate of Protection and Defense Security, DPSD), an intelligence entity within the Ministry of Defense with an interest in counterterrorism and counter-subversion. Given the degree of importance France places on using intelligence – as opposed to a formal risk-reduction/de-radicalization program – to counter violent extremism, the ability of these disparate agencies to expeditiously share vital intelligence from a wide array
of sources is vital and must be considered a key to any success that comes from this model.

Because the French approach includes no known focus on detained or convicted violent extremists, there was no discernible role for the French Prison Service. Magistrate Bruguiere conveyed that there was a generalized and growing concern about radicalization/recruitment in French prisons. He offered no specific data on the problem, but said that his appraisals were based largely on other studies he has reviewed and the comments of colleagues who are more directly involved in the French prison system. He also reported mounting concerns – internally and among security analysts elsewhere in Europe - about the expanding presence of the Islamic Takfiri movement (Al Takfir Wal-Hijra) in France and its implications for French state security.

**Program Outcomes**

No formal outcome evaluation has been conducted of France’s intelligence-driven approach to countering terrorism. They largely gauge their own success by the volume and quality of actionable intelligence on violent extremist activity, the number of arrests and disruptions of individuals and collectives engaged in violent extremist activity, and the absence of successful large-scale attacks within the country.
Conclusion

The QIASS Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project was a multi-national study of strategic counterterrorism approaches. This was not a comparative outcome study of – or competition between – international “de-radicalization” or “terrorist rehabilitation” programs. This is fortuitous because, as it turns out, each country’s approach was distinctly different and none of them has systematic “outcome” data that could be used for comparison purposes. Nevertheless, there is something of real importance to be learned from each of them.

- **Singapore** has a fully developed, multi faceted, resource-intensive risk reduction program for militant detainees. The Government uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) primarily to neutralize terrorist plots rather than charge suspects in court. ISA detainees may be placed in physical detention or restrictive community detention. Singapore’s Internal Security Department administers the program with extensive involvement from specialists in religious education, social services, and health/mental health. Singapore’s primary objective is to prevent a terrorist attack within its borders, but it also aims to “rehabilitate” the underlying violent ideological beliefs embraced by extremists and to support disengagement from terrorism.

- **Indonesia**’s government has no nationally coordinated strategy or any formal risk reduction programs for countering violent extremism; instead, it uses targeted personal relationship building as a form of CVE intervention. CVE efforts are distributed among the government and NGO sectors. Within the government, *Detachment 88* (Indonesia’s police counterterrorism unit) operates a relatively small and highly focused intelligence source development program. They make every effort to match unit members based on social characteristics and home community with known violent extremists to develop individual, personal relationships, sometimes even providing financial assistance/remuneration as a way to counter polarized perceptions against the police and to elicit valuable intelligence. The *Institute of International Peace Building*, an NGO founded in 2008 by a well-known former radical, also operates a small program (serving about ten ex-
extremist combatants) based on building personal relationships along with elements of job training and religious education.

- **Northern Ireland**’s CVE efforts are embedded in a multi-layered national peace process based on a philosophy of “engaged grievance management.” This process has spawned dozens of public and privately sponsored programs. The Police Service of Northern Ireland leads an engaged, community policing initiative, which aims to challenge the ideology of violent extremists, empower individuals who are vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, and enhance community resilience.

- **Great Britain** has an elaborate, multi-pronged national CVE effort, but one focused on persons “at-risk” rather than those who are convicted or detained. The strategic cornerstone, known as PREVENT, focuses on countering ideological support for violent extremism; disrupting those who promote the ideology; supporting persons vulnerable to recruitment; enhancing community resilience; and addressing extremist-related grievances. Individually-tailored interventions, delivered through a myriad of NGOs and community-based organizations, aim to inoculate persons at risk for recruitment against VE propaganda and empower them to make positive life choices. Community-level engagement and trust building initiatives aim to address some underlying conditions and grievances.

- **France** dismisses the potential value of rehabilitation or deradicalization programs for violent extremists and has opted instead for an intelligence-driven approach to prevention. They view terrorism principally as a strategic threat, not as a political or social deviation. French authorities use the leverage of their laws and justice system – including magistrate-led investigations – to collect intelligence against, and disrupt the operations of, individuals and groups engaged in violent extremist activity. They seek only to counter violence and terrorism, not the underlying ideologies.

We sought to distill some of the key lessons and experiences from these countries in a way that might be useful to other states or security agencies trying to navigate the complex challenges of countering violent extremism. The following are some of the key findings:
In countering violent extremism, one size does not fit all (or even most).

The diversity among the approaches in these countries was striking. In planning, however, each had not only considered the question of “what might work?” but also of “what might work here?” Fitting an approach to the local context and culture is absolutely essential for sustainable success. For this reason, in part, it is unlikely that a “gold standard” or universally-adaptable “model” program will ever emerge.

After decades of social policy evaluations, one consistent lesson about intervention is re-learned time and time again – from studies of psychotherapy effectiveness to crime control – you will never discern “what works” if you only ask “what works?” Interventions must “fit” the problem, the context, and sometimes the individual. In this sample of countries, for example, some programs have prominent religious components, while others have absolutely none. The way we understand a problem affects how we try to fix it, and this certainly holds true for CVE. There may be no single “right” answer to understanding violent extremism, but two suggestions are clear: local knowledge is often a good place to start and people’s motivational pathways in and through terrorism are often complicated. Extremism is not always driven by the “cause.”

Radicalization is better viewed as a process rather than an event. Similarly, violent extremism itself is affected by an array of factors that interact with one another, often in different ways at different points in time. There are different points in the process and different factors for possible intervention... and just as many points where things can go wrong. Risk reduction interventions can occur at any point in the CVE activity spectrum, and different contexts will require different kinds of initiatives to address different problem points on that continuum.
It is good to have a goal, but it is even better when you also have a strategy.

Among the countries we studied, most of them have a goal in mind, but few have a clearly defined strategy for how to get there. Nearly every country (presumably) wants to prevent acts of terrorism directed against its national interests. For some, it is not only the “bottom line,” it is the only line. Thus, they may proceed with the best of intentions and in the absence (or relative absence) of attacks, believe their objective has been met, and assume that what they are doing must, therefore, be working. Others have used a general framework often used in contemporary models of problem-oriented policing – identify the likely causes and patterns of the problem, then make a plan (strategy) for how address those driving factors in a way that will improve the outcomes.

The process is in many ways like developing a theory (with a lower case “t”) or a hypothesis about how and why certain persons may be engaging with certain violent extremist ideologies or organizations, in a particular place, and at a particular point in time, then crafting a solution – or solutions – around that proposition. Ideally, the hypothesis is ultimately “tested” and is either supported or not. Thus, countries considering a particular approach might pose the question to themselves: “What kind of outcome do I hope this particular approach or activity will produce and what kind of rationale or explanation can I provide to justify why I think this approach might cause that outcome?”

It helps to be clear up front about your outcome objectives, how you will measure them, and to carefully choose which ones to pursue.

How one defines the outcomes of interest can substantially alter the nature and direction of the approach. In the introduction to this report, we argued, for example, that “deradicalization” and “disengagement” programs might be fundamentally different. This is not to suggest that, in some generic sense, one is necessarily better than the other. Rather, they target different objectives, prioritize those objectives differently, carry different
assumptions, and require different resources and mechanisms. To think of them synonymously dilutes the program’s focus.

Even a rather uncontroversial objective – like “preventing recidivism” – can quickly turn fuzzy. This can be particularly vexing when attempting to evaluate a program’s success or effectiveness. Some might regard “recidivism” or “failure” as engaging in terrorist activity. Others might draw the line at re-engaging with extremist ideologies and groups, even in the absence of specific violent activity. Still others conceive of recidivism quite broadly to include any kind of criminal offending, whether or not it was related to violent extremism. Any of these options could be legitimate, but it is not reasonable to expect the same intervention to equally affect each of these outcomes. To do so risks wasting resources and potentially labeling as “failures” those persons whose risks and needs were completely misaligned with the intervention.

Nearly everyone thinks systematic program evaluations are important, but no one does them.

There is real, practical value to evaluating counterterrorism programs, approaches or initiatives. In principle, most people acknowledge the value of outcome evaluations, and nearly all acknowledge the value of generating new knowledge and learning from experiences to continuously improve a program. Though valued in principle, evaluations – in reality – tend to be neglected. Their pragmatic value is often lost among misguided assumptions that evaluation is purely an “academic” exercise, and something to be done by “researchers,” because those “in the trenches” are too busy and don’t have extra resources to spend on an evaluation project.

The “catch,” of course, is that sometimes programs do not work despite outward appearances of success. Or sometimes they have a modest, perhaps overstated benefit, which is grossly outweighed by the costs. Sometimes they work, but not on the outcomes intended or not for the reasons the designers assumed. In some instances – despite the very best of intentions – programs or approaches created to solve a problem actually make it worse. However, it is impossible to address any of these questions without systematic evaluation. This is not to suggest that measuring “success” or “effectiveness” of these efforts is easy – it can be immensely complicated. A fundamental lesson from systems theory is that what needs to be measured is
very often what is most difficult to measure. Program evaluations do not need to be terribly costly. On the other hand, unknowingly sustaining and growing a program that is not working is costly, inefficient, and, at times, even counterproductive.

**Systems and interagency relationships are critical.**

Partnerships among agencies and systems are a centerpiece of the approaches in every country we visited where there is any degree of satisfaction or success. In Singapore, security officials work extensively with social service professionals and religious leaders to create a synergy that none could accomplish alone. Even in France, where the approach is highly focused and not at all oriented to rehabilitation efforts, the interagency cooperation among law enforcement and intelligence services is one of the most significant factors in its success. In crafting an approach or a program, it is worth investing time and energy up front to include key community stakeholder in the planning and implementation process. There are risks and rewards for both the public and private sectors; as a result, both of these entities have important roles to play.

**Be mindful of the swamps..**

**and careful not to create new ones.**

Discussions of strategies for countering violent extremism often call, metaphorically, for “draining the swamps.” The basic idea is that violent extremism – and violent extremists – incubate in certain kinds of environments and under certain kinds of conditions. Trying only to counter those violent extremists that already exist will have limited long term benefit, since new ones are continuously being created. The implication is that long term solutions require “draining the swamps” or addressing the source of the problem flow, not just the products of it.

Research over the past several decades has failed to identify any single “root cause” that, by itself, is a sufficient condition for terrorism. But studies have also shown that certain conditions and combinations of conditions can facilitate or drive violent extremism, whether in the form of armed
insurgency or terrorism. Violent extremism is not evenly distributed throughout the world, and typically not even within a given country. Countries seeking to address the problem of violent extremism at a strategic level should carefully examine which “swamp-like” areas and conditions might exist locally. It may also be useful to reflect on the actions of the state itself and whether its actions, inactions, or reactions might be filling rather than draining the swamps or perhaps even creating new ones. This is yet another reason why it is useful to evaluate programs, and to have ways to measure whether they are working, so that these issues can be identified early.

The QIASS Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Risk Reduction Project explored a sample of strategic counter-terrorism approaches used throughout the world. There are certainly other countries with CVE initiatives that we did not visit, but which we might wish to include in a follow-up study.

Programs in the countries we visited, however, were quite diverse. Some focused on vulnerable individuals and communities, others focused only on convicted terrorists. Some focused on preventing new recruits and extremists, others only on preventing recidivism among known terrorists. Some programs had a prominent religious component, while others had none. Some were designed to modify radical beliefs, others aimed only to discourage terrorist behavior. Risk reduction was the unifying theme, and – consistent with Horgan and Braddock's (2010) recommendation – we suggest that there may be a more appropriate label for these collective efforts. The risk reduction framework might be productively viewed as a comprehensive model covering the full spectrum of CVE efforts, from primary prevention through rehabilitation.

The nature of this sample and the methodology employed do not permit a distillation of “best practices” as that term is commonly used. “Best practice” definitions and criteria typically require that the approach or technique has proved its success in implementation and is transferable elsewhere. Those practices are also typically defined by their relative, demonstrated superiority over other
approaches or techniques. Those conditions do not exist here. This body of practice is still relatively new. It will continue to evolve as the problem of violent extremism itself changes and as violent extremist organizations attempt to counter the CVE efforts. Knowledge development must be an ongoing effort.

Of particular note and concern was the finding that none of the countries we visited had systematic “outcome” data that could be used to evaluate them. This is a critical deficiency in this global enterprise. Knowledge of whether the program is “working” cannot be established without objective and systematic evaluation. Unknowingly sustaining and growing a program that is not working is costly, inefficient, and, at times, even counterproductive. We suggest that any new program, prior to implementation, consider how it might measure success or effectiveness and make a plan to use that information in program planning and evaluation. Hopefully, over time, results and experiences can be shared and disseminated across countries so that the global enterprise of risk reduction programming may one day be established as an evidence-based community of practice.